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ABSTRACT
Since the early 1970's the Moroccan government has implemented a
set of policies aimed at developing lagging regions and reducing
regional disparities. These policies involve institutional as
well as economic and financial vehicles for the promotion of
lagging regions economies.
Despite their variety, these policies were unable to influence
the financial servicing patterns in favor of the less developed
regions and counteract the tendency towards spatial
concentration.
The analysis of the financing patterns of the major public,
private, and international financial institutions shows that
whenever the financial rate of return on investment is considered
a main criterion, capital flows in priority into developed
regions.
The evaluation of the policies reveals two major issues. First,
the theoretical principles underlying the policies adopted are
based on assumptions that do not hold true in the context of
developing countries. Second, even when some of the critical
variables for regional development were identified, the measures
undertaken to deal with them were not the most adequate to solve
the problems involved.
Thesis Supervisor: Biswapriya Sanyal
Assistant Professor of
Urban Studies and Planning
1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
To Ali, Rabia, and all the others...
I would like to express my thanks to Bish Sanyal and Ralph
Gakenheimer for their advice, support, and understanding.
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No
ABSTRACT 1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS 3
LIST OF FIGURES 6
LIST OF TABLES 7
LIST OF ACRONYMS 8
TABLE OF EXCHANGE RATE 9
1. INTRODUCTION 10
2. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 12
2.1. Before Independence 12
2.2. After Independence 15
2.3. Regional Disparities: Highlights 18
3. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 23
3.1. Administrative Deconcentration 23
3.2. Creation/Strengthening of New Channels for the
Allocation of Public Resources for Regional
Development 25
3.3. Industrial Decentralization and Development Pole
Strategy 27
4. EVALUATION 29
4.1. Institutional Aspects 29
3
4.2 Regional Distribution of Large Projects Approved
by ODI 31
4.3. Distribution of Public Funds for Regional/Local
Development 34
4.3.1. Special Regional Development Fund 34
4.3.2. Local Authority Development Fund 35
4.3.3. Communal Supply Fund 36
4.4. Regional Distribution of World Bank Funded
Projects From 1962 to 1985 37
4.5. Regional Distribution of the Lending Activities of
Three Major Moroccan Financial Institutions 41
4.5.1. Banque Nationale Pour Le Developpement
Economique BNDE 41
4.5.2. Caisse Nationale Pour Le Credit
Agricole CNCA 42
4.5.3. Credit Immobilier et Hotelier CIH 44
4.5.4. Conclusion on the empirical findings 45
5. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES:
THEORIES AND REALITIES 50
5.1. Regional Development: Theoretical Background 50
5.2. General Limitations to the Validity of the
Neoclassical Location Theory 51
5.3. Policy Implications 52
5.4. Specific Limitations in the Context of Developing
Countries 53
5.5. Business and Tax Incentives: Empirical Findings 56
5.5.1. Effect of Tax Incentives on the Location
Decision of Firms 56
5.5.2. Opportunity Cost of Tax Incentives 56
5.5.3. Impact on Employment and Growth 58
6. CONCLUSION 61
7. RECOMMENDATIONS 64
ANNEXES 67
BIBLIOGRAPHY 69
5
LIST OF FIGURES
No Page No
1. Morocco 13
2. Distribution of Industrial Activities 1967 20
3. Distribution of Industrial Activities 1976 21
4. Distribution of Industrial Activities 1979 22
5. Provincial Boundaries 1973 and Economic
Regions 24
6. Location of Large Projects Having Benefited
From State Assistance 1973--1980 33
6
LIST OF TABLES
No Page No
1. Distribution of Manufacturing Industry 18
2. Regional Distribution of Large Projects
Approved by ODI 1973--1980 31
3. Grants Made by Special Regional Development
Fund, 1978--1979 34
4. Grants Made by Local Authority Development
Fund, 1978--1980 35
5. Distribution of FEC Projects Financed Under
1983 World Bank Loan Mor-2722 36
6. Regional Distribution of Bank Funded Projects
Regular Operations, 1962--1985 38
7. Regional Distribution of BNDE Lending
12-31-1979 41
8. Regional Distribution of BNDE Agreements
in 1980, 81, 82, and 84 42
9. CNCA, Regional Distribution of Real and
Potential Customers 43
10. Regional Distribution of CIH Lending to
Housing 1978--1984 44
11. Ranking of Institutions 46
12. CNCA, Detailed Table 67
13. Regional Distribution of CIH'S Hotel 68
Lending 1978--1984
7
LIST OF ACRONYMS
BNDE : BANQUE NATIONALE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE
National Bank For Economic Development
CIH : CREDIT IMMOBILIER ET HOTELIER
Lending Institution For Housing And Tourism
CNCA : CAISSE NATIONALE POUR LE CREDIT AGRICOLE
Lending Institution For Agriculture
FDCLG : FONDS DE DEVELOPPEMENT DES COLLECTIVITES LOCALES ET DE
LEUR GROUPEMENT.
Local Government Development Fund
FEC : FONDS D"EQUIPEMENT COMMUNAL
Communal Infrastructure Fund
FSDR : FONDS SPECIAL DE DEVELOPPEMENT REGIONAL
Special Regional Development Fund
ODI : OFFICE DU DEVELOPPEMENT INDUSTRIEL
Office For Industrial Development
wB : WORLD BANK
ABBREVIATIONS
DH : Moroccan Dirham
N.a : Non Available
Non Regional.: Non Regionalized
Oth. Regions : Other Regions
e
TABLE OF EXCHANGE RATE1
5.00
4.14
4.43
4.40
4.30
4.00
3.70
4.25
5.30
6.10
6.99
9.50
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
DH
9
1965
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
us
US
us
us
us
us
us
us
us
us
us
us
1. Picked randomly for each of the years indicated.
1. INTRODUCTION
In Morocco, as in many developing countries, regional
disparities are the result of historical, political and social
factors. These factors led to the current distribution of
national resources and income, and the regional differences in
access to production factors and markets. The goal to reduce
regional disparities and develop lagging regions is important for
equity and crucial for social stability.
Since the early 70's, the Moroccan government has paid
careful attention to regional issues. A set of policies were
implemented through the five year plans in order to reduce
regional disparities. These policies involve institutional as
well as economic and financial vehicles for the promotion of
lagging regions economies.
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate those policies and
the financial flows in Morocco, and thereby investigate the
effectiveness of the policy tools used to direct financial flows
towards the lagging regions.
The approach involves two main steps. First the regional
development policies and the financial flows patterns are
explored. Then theoretical explanations for the discrepancies
observed are discussed. I have also tried to identify the
critical variables that regional development policies should take
into account in the context of developing countries, and examined
how they were dealt with in the case of Morocco.
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The central hypothesis is that because regional policies are
based on assumptions that do not hold in the context of
developing countries, despite their variety these policies are
not able to influence the financing servicing patterns in favor
of the less developed regions and counteract the tendency towards
spatial concentration.
My analysis combines both empirical data and theoretical
literature. I have used the empirical findings as a support for
the theoretical search, whose conclusions frame the policy
recommendations.
The results of the Moroccan regional development experience
are evaluated through (i) the analysis of the policies
implemented throughout the several development plans, and (ii)
the analysis of the financial servicing patterns of major public
and mixed Moroccan financial institutions, and World Bank lending
activities in Morocco.
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2. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK
This chapter reviews the historical trends that have shaped
the spatial distributions of economic activities, as well as the
political events that have led to the adoption of policies aimed
at a more even spatial distribution of activities and income.
This historical and political background is important to our
understanding of the nature and the limitations of the policy
tools adopted by the Moroccan authorities.
2.1 Before Independence
The regional problems of Morocco are a heritage of
precolonial, colonial and post colonial economies and geopolitics
each showing maladjustments and poor adaptation from one stage to
the next.
In precolonial times sharp contrasts already existed between
the different regions of Morocco, as well as between the urban
and rural areas. The pattern of towns was the result of the
central place that Morocco occupied as point the of intersection
between the Arabic and European commercial spheres. The most
important cities (Fes, Meknes and Marrakech) were located on an
inland road network on which camels and beasts of burden were
relied on as a means of transport. This type of communication
induced a semi autonomous urban system in which the urban
linkages necessary for control by the monarchy and for trade were
12
loose, and permitted considerable provincial autonomy. In
addition, the urban network was characterized by a hierarchy of
urban and village market centers, complemented by the system of
weekly markets (souk). The country was thus endowed with a well
balanced urban hierarchy characterized by a dominantly inland
location of towns. The precolonial spatial pattern however,
presented an important particularity: the mountains with limited
agricultural resources were inhabited by sedentary rural
communities and were over populated; while the plains, with
important agricultural potential were inhabited by nomadic
pastoral communities and were poorly populated. Various factors
caused this contrast: epidemics, wars and invasions, but also the
prevalent tax system in the accessible plains which formed the
territory controlled by the Sultan (De Mas 1978).
FIGURE 1: MoroccoO
qw. ooA
"d. rOOD
~Source: DE MAS P. 1976
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Under the forty years of French domination, the most
important change was the shift of the urban concentration to the
Atlantic coast with the selection of Rabat as the governmental
center, Casablanca as the economical center, and the construction
of the new ports of Kenitra and Mohammedia. The rail and road
network were designed to drain the resources from the colony to
the metropolis. They radiated like a half web out of Casablanca
over the country.
By itself the logic of the colonial system was leading to
the development of the industries near the recently created
ports. First economic activities were not oriented towards the
development of the internal market, but towards the exports of
raw materials as well as finished or intermediate products.
Second most industries depended upon imports; and finally, the
local market was essentially composed of the European population
living on the Atlantic Coast: the farmers in the fertile
agricultural plains; and the administrative and political
apparatus in the two main cities of Rabat and Casablanca (Kaioua
A. 1984).
The precolonial spatial peculiarities (high density population in
poor mountainous regions, low density in the rich plains) which
existed in Morocco did not change during the colonial period, but
newer and greater disparities building up on the previous ones
were induced. The plains were taken over by French settlers.
Modern mechanized agriculture increased the yield and the value
14
added of these areas without leading to higher population
densities. In the mountainous regions, with traditional
agriculture, the imbalance between the size of the population and
the agricultural potential worsened. This worsening was the
result of the explosive growth of the population within the
limited cultivable areas, without the possibility of using the
plains already occupied by the French settlers as an outlet.
The spanish colonization of the northern zone, Rif and
Prerif, made this region an economically peripheral area cut off
from the rest of the country which was under the French
protectorate (De Mas 1978).
2.2. After Independence
The integration of the old Spanish zone into the former French
protectorate at the independence of the country in 1956
immediately caused great hardship and substantial increases in
the cost of living for the population. In 1958 and 1959, the
region experienced massive social unrest.
The orientation of the first Moroccan five year plan -- Plan
Quinquennal 1960-1964-- was largely influenced by these events.
The plan was characterized by: an effort to achieve economic
independence from external influence; extreme control by the
government of the key sectors of the economy in particular
industry; reform of the political structure by way of
Morocconization , modernization and democratization; and
lessening of social and regional disparities.
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In contrast with the later plans, maximum growth was not the
only objective of the first version of the first five year plan.
This plan was prepared in 1959 by a cabinet under the leadership
government officials who sympathized with the ideas of the
progressive parties.
The economic policy conveyed by the plan, with its
implication of less power for the King, encountered opposition
from the King himself and the political parties. The cabinet was
dissolved in May 1960, and a new version of the Plan was written
between May and November 1960. The new version lacked the reform
proposals that had characterized the previous one. Instead
priority was given to industry; and the control by government of
the different economic sectors was clearly limited. Agrarian
reform, and social and regional inequalities received no
attention.
The period of 1961-1964 started with the sudden death of
King Mohamed V and the accession to the throne of his son
Hassan II. The new King's endeavour was focused on the authority
of the monarch -- aiming for a position of unlimited power ( De
Mas 1978).
The next two plans gave the priority respectively to the
reorganization of the monetary situation, and to irrigated
agriculture. The social and regional inequalities received no
attention. The strategy of the sixties was that maximum economic
growth would lead to a decrease in the income differences among
social groups and regions. This strategy lamentably failed. As
16
indicated in the 1973-1977 plan, while the richest and the
poorest 10% of the population consumed respectively 25% and 3.3%
of the total consumption, by 1972 they consumed 37% and 1.2%
respectively (Plan 1973-1977, p. 14 quoted in De Mas 1978).
The worsened economic situation at the beginning of the
seventies culminated in the attempts on the King life in 1971 and
1972. This led to reforms in politics and planning. The King
admitted that his policy which was aimed at improving the
condition of the poor without hurting the rich, had failed. The
new government he constituted dedicated itself to the realization
of a fairer distribution of national income. Eighteen months
later a program of national reform involving decisive measures
regarding regional planning was formulated.The regional
development program has been carried out since.
Despite the wide variety of institutional and policy tools
it involves, the results of the fifteen years of Moroccan
regional planning are much less conclusive than expected.
Currently the population is concentrated in the fertile and
prosperous plains and coastal areas of the Northwest of the
country. The most important urban and economic concentrations are
on the coast, notably Rabat (seat of the government) and
Casablanca (economic capital). The inland areas are marked by
the older urban concentrations of Fes, Meknes and Marrakech.
17
2.3 Regional Disparities: Highlights
The northern and primarily coastal location of economic
activities has severely affected development elsewhere. According
to a 1984 World Bank study':
"manufacturing industry is heavily concentrated in the
region of Casablanca in terms of number of firms (57%),
output (69%), employment (64%), and exports (40%). The
second important region is the Northwest (Tanger, Rabat)
with 19% of the number of firms, 12% of output, 18% of
employment, and 16% of exports. The region of Tensift
(Marrakech and Safi) is also important in terms of output
(9%) and exports (29%). The four other regions (South,
Oriental, Center-North, and Center-South) have a negligible
place in Moroccan manufacturing".
The following table summarizes these data.
TABLE 1
Distribution of manufacturing industry
Regions Firms Output Employment Exports
%A % %A %
Center 57 69 64 40
North West 19 12 18 16
Tensift N.a 9 N.a 29
Oth.Regions N.a N.a N.a N.a
Total 100 100 100 100
3 World Bank: Morocco: Industrial Incentives and Export
Promotion, 1984
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Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the increasing concentration of Moroccan
industrial activities as measured in terms of jobs, between 1967
and 1979.
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Figure 2
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Figure 3
Distribution of Industrial Activities 1976'
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Figure 4
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3. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
The regional development policies defined and implemented by
Moroccan authorities throughout the 1973-77, the 1978-80 and
1981-86 development plans, are based upon three main principles:
(i) administrative deconcentration,(ii) allocation of public
financial resources for regional and local development, and (iii)
industrial investment decentralization in relation to the
creation of development poles.
3.1. Administrative Deconcentration and Regional Administration
The structure of local institutions in Morocco clearly
reflects its antecedents in the French centralized state
administrative tradition. There are basically two types of local
institutions in Morocco: (i) institutions that represent,
protect, and advance the interest of the central government at
the regional, provincial and municipal levels, and (ii) local
governments led by locally elected officials at the municipal
level.
(i) In 1971, the Government created seven Economic Regions,
grouping together several provinces generally around an
urban development pole, as a "framework for economic action"
(Law of June 16, 1961). The regional administration consists
of the regional consultative assembly (regrouping member of
the elected provincial assemblies and representatives of the
23
Chambers of Agriculture, Commerce, Craft, and Industry), the
provincial governors (representatives appointed by the King
in the provinces), and regional representatives of central
administration departments. To date the region's major role
has been to provide inputs for economic planning through
submission to the national government of investment
proposals prepared by its consultative assembly.
FIGURE 5
Provincial Boundaries 1973 and Economic Regions?
Provinces . RM
Situation 1973 1" N
.. .
f.i m . .
- atc
(ii) As part of the decentralization process, an important
number of new provinces were created. Provinces and their
chief executives, the Governors, constitute the main
intermediary between the central and municipal levels of
government. Governors are directly appointed by the King.
'7. Source: DE MAS. 1978
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Administratively they are responsible to the Minister of
Interior. Their primary function is to carry out the
Ministry of Interior's twin responsibilities: to maintain
law and order, and to oversee the political, administrative
and financial affairs of local governments. In 1963 elected
provincial assemblies were formed and given (at least
theoretically) more power and responsibilities. Each
assembly approves the provincial budget (which is entirely
financed by subsidies from the central government, prepared
by the Governor, and may be imposed on the province by the
Minister of Interior over the assembly's objections).
(iii) In 1976, the adoption of the local authority chart
(Charte Communale) established a directly elected municipal
council in the communes, and was intended to increase the
power and responsibilities of the local communities.
Currently, at the municipal level, two parallel structures
share responsibility for municipal affairs: the municipal
council elected locally, and the pacha or the caid appointed
by the central government and representing central
interests.
3.2. Allocation of Financial Public Resources for Regional/Local
Development
Local governments in Morocco depend to a large extent on the
central government to finance (through transfers, grants,
subsidies, and loans) a substantial share of their expenditures.
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Despite the regionalization carried out through the new
institutional framework which facilitated an increased
involvement of the regions in the preparation of the plans, many
difficulties were encountered regarding the methods and
mechanisms necessary to achieve regionalization: information was
not regionalized; the possible locations for projects were not
always specified; the Secretariat for Planning found it extremely
difficult to regionalize the investments of the different
ministries. Because of the difficulties in allocating budgetary
distribution by regions under the capital budget, the Government
decided to establish/strengthen three channels of financing for
regional development purposes.
(i) The Communal Infrastructure Fund (Fonds d'Equipement
Communal or FEC) created in 1959. It constitutes the only
source of loans available to local governments for
infrastructure and development projects.In the last decade
FEC has grown rapidly, and its role and capacity to finance
municipal development projects is being strengthened.
(ii) The Special Regional Development Fund (Fonds Special de
Developpement Regional or FSDR) which was established in
1973 to finance by means of central subsidies and grants,
infrastructure projects in the least developed regions. This
fund is now being phased out.
(iii) The local Government Development Fund (Fonds de
Developpement des Collectivites Locales et de leur
Groupement or FDCLG) which was established in 1976 as part
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of the decentralization reform. This Fund is a chief source
of central subsidies and grants. It is administered by the
Ministry of Interior, and the Government has recently
entrusted the provinces with the local distribution of the
funds.
3.3 Investment Decentralization and Regional Development Poles.
The goal of deconcentrating investments involved both public
and private funding. In order to counterbalance the appeal of the
Casablanca-Rabat-Kenitra axis, five cities were proposed in the
1973-77 development plan as future economic development poles:
Oujda, Agadir, Marrakech, Fes and Tanger. In order to
deconcentrate private investments, the 1973 investment code
offered 10 years tax incentives for enterprises establishing
themselves outside Casablanca. The exemption allowed was 100%
for some provinces. However, according to the 1921-1986 Plan, the
tendency to concentrate most of the industrial investments in and
around Casablanca-Mohammedia is not declining. As a result,
decentralization of private investment under the 1981-1986
development plan, was also being stimulated by (a) an effort to
provide serviced land at a reasonable cost to entrepreneurs
through the Office of Industrial Development (Office du
Developpement Industriel, ODI),(b) employment premiums calculated
on the basis of the number of jobs generated, and (c) assistance
with personnel training for enterprises interested in locating
in poor provinces.
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In addition, the plan adopted new measures to move the rural
development process away from the fringe of irrigated areas and
deeper into the arid zones. These measures involve the
amelioration and organization of livestock raising, the
development of small and medium scale waterworks, the promotion
of small and medium size enterprises, and so on. They mark a
shift away from the large scale irrigation projects which had
characterized agricultural policy in the 1960's and early 70's.
Spatially they imply a shift toward the mountainous regions of
rainfed agriculture and the arid zones.
4. EVALUATION
The set of policies implemented in Morocco integrates
three essential and complementary components of a regional
development program:
(a) Institutional changes --aimed at transferring power,
authority, and responsibility from the central, to the
regional/local level. This transfer is properly supposed to
be one of the conditions, and also one of the factor of
regional development.
(b) Public social and infrastructure investment --aimed at
improving regional conditions (health, education, training,
infrastructure), creating greater external economies and
therefore increasing their potential for development.
(c) Tax and other incentives aimed at inducing private
developers to invest in lagging regions.
In the following section we will review the impact of the
policies; examine the distribution of industrial investment); and
investigate the financial servicing patterns by looking at the
spatial distribution of the activities of different financial
institutions: public institutions in charge of the funding of
development projects, national banks lending to private sector,
international lending for development projects.
4.1. Institutional Aspects
The question of deconcentration versus decentralization is
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the keystone for appreciating the impact of the institutional
measures adopted in Morocco. Deconcentration in this context
refers to the delegation of responsibilities to the regional
echelons of a structure which remains in its entirety governed by
the principle of a central authority which keeps the right to
reassume at any time the responsibility it delegated. On the
contrary, decentralization presumes the existence of an elected
body with its own area of authority. The measures adopted in
Morocco at the different levels of local government, are more of
a deconcentraion than a decentralization type.
The Economic Regions are principally a spatial framework for
planning rather than an essential level in the administrative
structure. The multiplication of the number of provinces and
therefore of provincial governors is also a way of increasing the
controlling power of the central authority. The consultative
assemblies, elected body at the provincial level do not have any
political or financial power.At the municipal level the elected
council has to share the responsibilities for municipal affairs
with the Pacha (appointed by the central government and
representing central interests). Although these two hierarchies
-- one modern, the other traditional-- are supposed to carry out
different tasks, they often work together with some tension and
conflicts.
Actually these features, i.e, the importance of the
Governor's role and the extent of his supervisory authority, the
weakness of the provincial consultative assemblies, and the
30
control exerted by the local executive authority (Pacha, Caid)
over the municipal council, demonstrate the yet excessive
centralization of the Moroccan administrative apparatus.
4.2. Regional Distribution of Large Projects Approved Through the
Investment Code During the 1973-77 and 1978-80 Development Plans
The main objective of the regional development package was
to stimulate industrial investment outside the coastal Casablanca
Rabat Kenitra axis.
The following table indicates the regional distribution of large
projects (involving amounts equal to or larger than 10 Million
Dirham) that have been approved by the Office for Industrial
Development (ODI), in application of the Investment Code between
1973 and 1980. These projects benefitted from state assistance.
TABLE 2
Regional Distribution of Large Projects approved by O.D.I.
1973-1980
Share Per
Regions Amount % Capita
(in M. DH) (in DH)
Oriental 860.6 15% 583
Center 2327.2 39% 419
North-West 1538.3 26% 375
Tensift 905.1 15% 307
Center-North 156.8 3% 65
Center-South 73.1 1% 48
South 54.6 1% 23
Total 5915.7 100% 290
Source: Computed from data drawn from "L'Espace Industriel
Marocain de Kenitra a Casablanca", KAOUIA Abdelkader,
1984 p.133.
Despite the official discourse and the measures undertaken to
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induce a decentralization of the productive apparatus, in
absolute terms the investments approved by O.D.I.,the Office for
Industrial Development, were heavily concentrated in the Atlantic
Coast, especially in the developed regions of Center (39%) and
Northwest (26%). However, on a per capita basis the regions of
Oriental and to a lesser extent Tensift turn out to have
benefitted from a substantial share of investments during that
period. Oriental has the highest share per capita, and Tensift's
share is above the national average. In contrast, the three
regions of Center-North, Center-South and South were completely
neglected.
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FIGURE 6
Location of Large Projects Having Benefitted From
State Assistance between 1973 and 198o"
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4.3.Distribution of Public Funds for Regional/Local Development
Though there is no systematic data on the regional
distribution of public funds, some information is available on
the grants made by the Special Regional Development Fund (FSDR)
in 1978-1979 and those made by the Local Government Development
Fund (FDCLG) in 1978-1960. The grants were made mainly to finance
projects in sewage and sanitation, drinking water, public health,
rural roads, electrification, and local staff training.
4.3.1. Special Regional Development Fund (FSDR)
Table 3 shows the distribution of grants made by Special
Regional Development Fund in 1978 and 1979.
TABLE 3
Grants Made By Special Regional Development
Fund, 1978-1979
(in DH)
Share
Per
Regions Amount % Population Capita
South 222321000 32% 2424808 92
Oriental 67588000 10% 1475376 46
Center-South 60693000 9% 1512046 40
Tensift 69511000 10% 2944591 24
Center-North 42649000 6% 2397689 18
Center 79743000 12% 5559658 14
North-West 53590000 8% 4105387 13
Non-Regional. 89569000 13%
Total 685664000 100% 20419555 34
Source: Computed from data drawn from Projet de Developpement
Economique et Social (Rabat: Avril 1981, Volume I, p.6 6 ), Royaume
du Maroc. Population data are drawn from 1982 census.
On a per capita basis, Center and North-West, which are the
two more developed regions of Morocco benefitted least from FSDR
grants. Most of the funds were used to finance projects in poor
regions such as South, Oriental and Center-South. South, which is
one of the less developed regions, received the lion's share of
the funding. The obvious explanation is that the region contains
the Saharan territories, and the funding pattern is one of the
response of Moroccan authorities to the claims for autonomy of
the Polisario front.
4.3.2. Local Authority Development Fund (FDCLG)
The following table indicates the regional distribution of
FDCLG grants from 1978 to 1980:
TABLE 4
Grants Made By Local Authority Development
Fund From 1978 to 1980
(in DH)
Share
Per
Regions Amount % Population Capita
Oriental 72250000 7% 1475376 49
South 103649000 9% 2424808 43
North-West 173580000 16% 4105387 42
Center 204152000 19% 5559658 37
Center-North 89668000 8% 2397689 37
Tensift 106457000 10% 2944591 36
Center-South 54992000 5% 1512046 36
Non Regional. 293552000 27%
Total 1098300000 100% 20419555 54
Source: Computed from data drawn from Projet de Developpement
Economique et Social (Rabat: Avril 1981, Volume I, p.66), Royaume
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du Maroc. Population data are drawn from 1982 census.
The funding pattern of FDCLG displays much less variance
than FSDR. And even though lagging regions such as Oriental and
South benefitted from the highest per capita allocation, the
developed provinces of Northwest and Center were attributed a
substantial share of the funds.
4.3.3. Communal Supply Fund (FEC)
Financing patterns of Communal Supply Fund are appreciated
through the regional distribution of FEC financed projects under
the 1983 World Bank loan "Mor-2272" aimed at strengthening FEC
and expanding its activities.
TABLE 5
Distribution of FEC Projects Financed
Under 1983 World Bank Loan Mor-2272
(in DH)
Share
Per
Regions Amount % Population Capita
North-West 64125000 34% 4105387 16
Center-North 31625000 17% 2397689 13
Center 57513750 30% 5559658 10
South 17612500 9% 2424808 7
Oriental 10812500 6% 1475376 7
Tensift 7000000 4% 2944591 2
Center-South 2187500 1% 1512046 1
Total 191076250 100% 20419555 9
Source: Computed from FEC, Etat des Projets Soumis au
Refinancement au 30 Avril 1986. Population data are drawn from
1982 census.
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The regional distribution of the lending activities of
Communal Supply Fund differ substantially from the distribution
patterns of FSDR and FCDLG. The main borrowers are the regions of
Casablanca (Center, 30%) and Rabat (North-West, 34%) . The
highest ratios of DH per capita are to be found in those two
regions and in Center-North. All other undeveloped areas benefit
from a negligible amount of FEC lending. Actually, Center, North-
West and center-North are the coastal areas of Morocco (Atlantic
and Mediterranean sides). They contain the most important
municipalities of the country; precisely those which have the
managerial and technical capabilities to propose fundable
projects to a lending institution (FEC), and which can be
considered as secure borrowers.
4.4. Regional Distribution of World Bank Funded Projects From
1962 to 1985
This part of the analysis does not bear on all World Bank
lending to Morocco. It excludes most lines of credit projects.
The purpose is to distinguish between regular operation projects,
i.e.,projects whose location was decided prior to Bank approval
of the loan, and lines of credit for which the location of
subprojects is unknown at the time of approval. In the case of
lines of credits, the loan is typically made to a major Moroccan
financial institution which is then in charge of lending to
Moroccan private entrepreneurs. All subprojects are submitted for
World Bank approval before funding. The analysis of the lending
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patterns of the Moroccan financial institutions which manage Bank
lines of credit projects is undertaken in the next section of
this chapter. Regular projects analyzed represent 52% of Bank
lending to Moroccoand lines of credit 48% (1,560 million of 1984
$ of which 618 in Agriculture and 922 in Industrial Development
Finance projects). Regarding World Bank line of credit projects
which are financed by Moroccan financial institutions we assume
that the regional distribution of the lending activities of the
latter do not depend on the source of the funds they are
managing. Therefore World Bank expenditures in Agriculture and
Industry, which are in majority made through line of credits
projects, are considered as having the same patterns of
distribution as the Moroccan institutions managing those funds.
TABLE 6
Regional Distribution of Bank Funded Projects
Regular Operations From 1962 to 1985
Share
Project Per
Region costs X Population Capita
North West 977 24% 4.105387 238
Oriental 302 7% 1.475376 205
Center South 256 6% 1.512046 169
Tensift 376 9% 2.944591 128
Center 657 16% 5.559658 118
Center North 263 6% 2.397689 110
South 243 6% 2.424808 100
Subtotal 3074 75% 20.419555 151
National Impact 659 16% 20.419555 32
Not Allocated 391 9% 20.419555 19
Total 4124 100% 20.419555 268
Source: Location Analysis of World Bank Funded Projects in
Morocco. World Bank, EMENA Urban Projects Division, July 1986.
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Though the developed regions of Northwest and Center
received on aggregate terms the largest share of Bank
expenditures, on a per capita basis, with the exception of
Northwest which has the highest ratio, the distribution turns out
to be more in favor of lagging regions such as Oriental, Center
South and Tensift.
The analysis of the distribution of World Bank expenditures
within the regions shows different patterns depending on the
nature of the investment sector. Investment in the directly
productive sectors are concentrated spatially; in the
infrastructure sector investment it is more dispersed; and it is
in the social sectors that investment is most evenly distributed:
"While in the richest regions (North-West and Center),
expenditures have been dispersed between the different
provinces, in poorest regions, the trend has been to
concentrate them in one province usually coinciding with the
province designated by the Moroccan authorities to play the
role of development pole. Social sector investments are the
most evenly distributed among regions and provinces among
the regions; educational projects have benefitted 27
provinces, and urban projects 23. Infrastructure
investments, with the exception of power projects which
benefitted 24 provinces, are more concentrated. Highway
projects benefitted 12 provinces and water supply 10.
Agricultural and to a larger extent industrial investments
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whose location is necessarily related with the resources and
the quality of economic environment of the provinces are
much less dispersed. Agricultural investments have been made
in 15 provinces and , IDF (Industrial Development Finance)
in 4 provinces."'
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' World Bank: Morocco: Location Analysis of Bank Funded
Projects, 1986.
4.5. Regional Distribution of the Lending Activities of Three
Major Moroccan Financial Institutions
4.5.1. Banque Nationale pour le Developpement EconomiqueBNDE
The National Bank for Economic Development (BNDE) was created in
1959. The following table shows the regional distribution of BNDE
interventions since its creation to 1979.
TABLE 7
Regional Distribution of BNDE lending 12-31-1979
Source: BNDE, Les Operations de la BNDE en 1979.
As shown in the table, more than 50% of BNDE lending was in
favor of companies whose headquarters were located in Casablanca-
Mohamadia. Though the activities of many of them and especially
those in the fishing and maritime transport sectors, span the
whole country, the weight of Casablanca in BNDE's lending remains
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Region Designation Amount %
('000 DH)
Center Casablanca &
Mohammedia 3671303 54%
North West Rabat 401533 6%
Center South Meknes 236631 4%
Center North Fes 226715 3%
Tahla 108415 2%
North West Tetouan 65849 1%
Tanger 364878 5%
Oriental Oriental 224834 3%
Tensift Marrakech 179932 3%
South Agadir 168468 2%
Oth.Regions 1095109 16%
Total 6743568 100%
very important (about 60%). All other regions occupied a
negligible place in BNDE's activities.
After 1979, the distribution of agreements did not evolve
toward a lessening of the concentration of economic activities.
TABLE 8
Regional Distribution of BNDE Agreements
in 1980, 81, 82, and 84
Region 1980 1981 1982 1984
South 14% 3% 8% 13%
Tensift 3% 3% 4% 1%
Center 49% 79% 59% 67%
North West 26% 9% 14% 13%
Center North 5% 3% 7% 2%
Oriental 1% 2% 3% 2%
Center South 2% 2% 5% 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: BNDE, Yearly Reports, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1984.
On the contrary, Casablanca's region has seen its share of
BNDE's lending increase, reaching 79% in 1981 and 67% in 1984.
Two other regions were allocated decent proportions of BNDE's
lending: North-West which is the region ranked second with regard
to the concentration of economic activities in Morocco, and South
which is for political considerations the object of massive
investment.
4.5.2. Caisse Nationale Pour Le Credit Agricole CNCA
In a 1982 document "Credit Agricole, Bilan et Perspectives.
Octobre 1982", CNCA, the National Bank for Agricultural Credit
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made an evaluation of its activities, and presented an overview
of future prospects. The following table indicates the regional
distribution of CNCA's real and potential customers. Potential
customers are identified by CNCA according to its lending
criteria.
TABLE 9
CNCA Regional Distribution of Real and Potential Customers
Region Real Potential
Center 33% 27%
Tensift 21% 13%
North-West 15% 19%
Center North 12% 17%
Center South 10% 8%
Oriental 5% 3%
South 3% 12%
Total 100% 100%
Source: Credit Agricole Bilan et Perspective, October 1982
Annex 1 Table 9.
The regions of Center and Tensift are those which
benefitted most from CNCA lending (benefits are measured
according to the number of lenders and not the volume of
lending). These two regions include more than 50% of the real
customers: the five other regions share less than 50% of the
customers.
The distribution of potential customers, which can be
considered as CNCA's objectives for the future, shows that Region
Center will remain the major beneficiary of the institution's
lending, followed by North West where CNCA intends to quadruple
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the number of its customers (see Table 2 in Annex). South and
Oriental, despite the substantial projected increase of the
number of their customers, will remain among the less benefitting
regions (see Table 2 in Annex). The prospective distribution of
CNCA customers does not meet the 1981-1986 Development Plan's
concern to shift the rural development process away from the
fringe of irrigated areas and deeper into the mountainous
regions and the arid zones.
4.5.3. Credit Immobilier et Hotelier CIH
CIH lends to the housing and hotel sectors. Table 10
indicates the regional distribution of CIH lending for housing
construction from 1978 to 1984.
TABLE 10
Regional Distribution of CIH Lending To Housing
From 1978 to 1984
Location 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Casablanca 39% 45% 45% 46% 42% 45% 47%
Rabat 36% 24% 30% 21% 28% 17% N.a.
Fes 13% N.a. N.a. N.a. 12% 9% 7%
Marrakech 7% N.a. N.a. N.a. 9% 8% 11%
Oujda 5% N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 10% 4%
Agadir N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 8% 8% 6%
Tanger N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a. 3% 3%
Total 100% 100% 00% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: CIH Yearly Reports 1978,79,81,82,83,84.
The figures mentioned in CIH annual reports clearly show the
predominance of Casablanca and to a lesser extent of Rabat. These
two cities benefitted from more than two thirds of the
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institution's lending to housing every year. The remaining third
is shared between the rest of the country's biggest cities (Fes,
Marrakech, Agadir, and Tanger).
CIH's hotel expenditures (see Table 1 in Annex) were more
diversified than its expenditures in housing. The review of these
expenditures from 1978 to 1984 shows a clear predominance of
Marrakech (33%), followed by Casablanca and Center region (29%),
and then by Agadir and South region (25%). Fes and Tanger are
minor borrowers with 11 and 2% respectively.
4.5.4. Conclusion on the empirical findings
Table 13 summarizes for each institution its status; the nature
of its financing service; and ranked from 1 (highest) to 3
(lowest), the three regions that benefitted most of its
investments expenditures. We recall that the regions of Center,
North West, and to a lesser extent Tensift are those which most
concentrate economic activities. Although the table does not
include information on absolute amounts, relative proportion and
per capita share of investments, it allows us to sketch a global
picture of the distribution patterns, and to summarize the
partial conclusions drawn for each individual financial
institution.
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TABLE 11
Ranking of Institutions
Public Mixed-9 Int'l
FSDR FDCL FEC BNDE CNCA CIH.H& CIH.T7 WBf
Center 3 1 1 1 2
North West 3 1 2 3 2 1
Tensift 2 1
South 1 2 3 3
Oriental 2 1 2
Center North 2 3 3
Center South 3
By drawing a line after Tensift to separate developed from
lagging regions, we can see that FSDR, FDCL, and World Bank
regular operations have primarily funded lagging regions, where
all others have invested in priority in lagging region. In the
following section we will explore some clues to the distribution
patterns.
The financing pattern of the three public institutions
analyzed varies depending on the nature of the service they
provide. FSDR and FDCLG which finance development projects by
means of subsidies and grants, to a varying degree both give the
priority to lagging regions. FEC whose role is to finance
municipal development projects by means of loans, concentrate its
' Mixed institutions are partly private, partly public. They
manage funds from diverse sources including World Bank lines of credit
CIH lending for housing.
7 CIH lending for tourism.
* World Bank regular operations.
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activities in the two most developed regions of North West and
Center, but also in the less developed Center North.
All the other Moroccan financial institutions analyzed are
lending institutions and direct their activities in priority
towards the more developed regions of the country.
The distribution of World Bank regular operations
expenditures varies depending on the investment sector. They are
evenly distributed between the regions for the so called social
sectors (urban, education...), and more concentrated in the case
of projects in the directly productive sectors where the pattern
is assimilated to the distribution of lending activities of the
Moroccan financial institutions.
Two parameters seem to determine the financing pattern in terms
of spatial distribution:
-- The nature of the financing service: grants versus loans,
-- The nature of the investment sector: social versus
directly productive sector.
Contrary to what might have been expected, the source of the
funds, i.e., public institutions, national banks, international
agency, is not a main determinant of the distribution pattern.
Actually the fact that grants, subsidies and expenditures in
the social sectors display such a different distribution pattern
than lending and expenditures in the directly productive sectors
suggests the following observation: Despite the complete variety
of policy tools used, whenever the financial rate of return on
investments is taken into account as a main criterium, capital
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flows primarily into developed regions.
The conclusions of this evaluation leads to elicit the
following questions: Why does the Moroccan regional development
program have so little effect on the investments and financial
flows patterns?
-- Were wrong policies followed? In other world, was it wrong
to assume that regional development could be achieved by
administrative decentralization, redistribution of public
financial resources through new channels, and by giving
incentives to private investment in lagging regions?
-- Or, were the measures adopted to implement these policies
wrong? Why administrative deconcentration (delegation of
power, authority, responsibilities) instead of
administrative decentralization (transfer of power,
authority..)? Why not undertake fiscal decentralization
instead of creating or strengthening new channels to
allocate financial public resources from the central to the
regional/local level. Could the public resources used (or
those foregone through tax exemptions) to direct investment
from the developed to the lagging regions have been better
used in programs aimed at the generation of local resources
for development?
-- What were the effects of each one of these choices on the
results of the program?
In order to answer these questions it is necessary to
consider the political and economical conditions of Morocco, as
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well as the theoretical and conceptual framework of regional
development policies from which the Moroccan experience draws.
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5.REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES: THEORIES AND
REALITIES.
5.1. Theoretical Background
The objective of this section is to sketch the assumptions
underlying neoclassical location theories, identify the reasons
why these assumptions may not hold true in general, and the
reasons why they do not hold true particularly in the context of
developing countries.
Regional differences in availability of production factors
or access to production factors and to markets are at the origin
of interregional disparities.
According to neoclassical economic theory, core regions are
characterized by a scarcity of natural resources and of labor,
while peripheral areas suffer from a scarcity of capital and
technology. The determinant conceptual element is that factor
returns will be high in areas of scarcity and low in areas of
abundance. Consequently, core regions which are characterized
by a scarcity of natural resources and of labor should have a
high return on labor and natural resources, whereas peripheral
regions should have high return on capital and technology.
The main assumptions underlying the theory are:
-- Complete mobility and homogeneity of production factors
(except physical capital: buildings, land..),
-- Decreasing marginal returns; it has been argued that
50
agglomeration economies might be offset by higher per capita
absorption costs, congestion costs, and communication
diseconomies (Richardson, 1969),
-- Perfect knowledge on the part of producers and buyers and
complete predictability,
-- Inexhaustible entrepreneurship and technical skills,
--Fully developed transportation network.
Under these assumptions, natural resources and labor should
flow from peripheral areas to core regions, while capital and
technology will flow from core regions to peripheral regions. The
process would increase factor supply in areas of scarcity and
reduce it in areas of abundance eventually leading to an
equalization of factor prices over space (Richardsoni969).
5.2. General Limitations of Neoclassical Location Theory.
It appears that not all production factors tend towards
spatial equilibrium of supply and demand.The tendency towards
spatial equilibrium is counteracted by:
-- Different degrees of factors mobility
--Heterogeneity of factors
-- Increasing factor returns at the core due to the unequal
spatial distribution of external economies and scale economies.
Labor is not homogeneous, and though in aggregate terms
labor moves from low wage areas to high wage areas, in reality
this migration is highly selective and its effects often lead to
further polarization rather than equalization. Migrants from
51
peripheral to core areas usually come from the more mobile and
productive population strata (the potential high wage earners).
As a result migration, which reduces aggregate labor supply, also
reduces the average wage level at the periphery rather than
increasing it (as would neoclassical theory imply). Furthermore,
migration, because of the selective character mentioned above,
diminishes the production potential of peripheral areas (Stohr
W., Tolding F. 1978).
Capital flows, too, do not tend towards regional
equilibrium. Empirical studies (Stohr W., Tolding F. 1978) have
shown that capital flows from peripheral areas (where capital is
"scarce" and capital cost is high) to core regions (where capital
is "abundant" and capital cost is relatively low). The main
reason for such a pattern is the higher productivity of capital
in core regions due to a comparative advantage in scale and
external economies that do not seem to be often offset by high
per capita absorption costs, congestion costs or communication
diseconomies.
5.3. Policy Implications
The implications in terms of policies are that the major
instruments of regional development in market and mixed economies
aim to change these disequilibrating flows. Because in most
market economies, migration is outside of direct policy control,
major policy tools have concentrated on inverting flows of
capital, and on creating greater external economies in peripheral
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areas through public infrastructure investment. The Moroccan
experience draws from that stream of thought.
5.4. Specific Conditions in the Context of Developing Countries
We have already seen the general limitations to complete mobility
and homogeneity of production factors, and decreasing marginal
returns. We will now examine the reasons why the remaining
assumptions do not hold true in the context of developing
countries.
These assumptions are:
-- Fully developed transportation network,
-- Perfect knowledge and predictability,
-- Inexhaustible entrepreneurship and technical skills.
In most developing countries, the configuration of transport
network is an inheritance of colonial times. Transport network
was not designed to achieve national development requirements,
but instead to drain resources from the colony to the metropolis.
As, a result rather than being a lattice covering the whole
national territory, transport network typically converges
towards great port cities. In addition, after independence,
transport and communication investment is made in priority
between major urban centers, and to a lesser extent between core
regions and (respective) peripheries. Very little investment in
transport infrastructure is made to connect peripheral areas to
each other. These investment patterns do not facilitate a
mobility of production factors in favor of remote and lagging
53
areas.
Information which is a central assumption in neoclassical
location theory, is not evenly available either. The more remote
a region is, the less is known about its production potentials,
cost and timing of operation, local customs, chemical and
physical properties of local material and so on. Also, the more
remote a region is, the less likely it is that relevant
information on investment opportunities and management decisions
will reach it.
This constitutes a critical issue in developing countries where
political and economic conditions change rapidly and often
unpredictably. Ministries are reorganized, regulations are
changed, costs and availability of funds fluctuate, relative
factor price vary suddenly... Relevant information about these
matters is not channeled in a democratic and systematic way, but
through personal contact, rumor and so on.
Thus, whereas information is vitally needed because of the
rapidity and frequency of changing situations, the sources and
modes of information are unperiodic, unpredictable, and require
cultivation of sources and personal contacts. Getting information
as well as solving problems requires intangible and delicate
negotiations which are conducted through personal, face-to-face
contacts, and lead to a tremendous pressure towards spatial
concentration.
Finally, entrepreneurship and technical skills are not
inexhaustible and evenly available. Universities are often
located in major centers. Managers and technicians for a
multitude of obvious personal reasons prefer to live in major
cities. Inducements to get them to less developed areas are
likely to be expensive because of the compensation necessary to
make up for the advantages given up, and not so successful in
this sense that it may attract only second raters.
None of the assumptions underlying classical location theory
hold in the context of developing countries. Factor flows do not
follow the expected pattern and do not lead to an equalization of
factor prices overtime. Actually because of the uncertainties
attached to the investment decision, higher return is required to
justify investment in underdeveloped regions. These uncertainties
add to the certainty of having poorer communications, slower
deliveries, incompetence, absence of supporting services... The
uncertainties add to the risks and the certainties add to the
costs. Both lead towards spatial concentration, and location in
developed regions. There ought to be large and clear advantage to
justify location outside of developed centers (Alonso W. 1975)
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5.5. Business and Tax Incentivess Empirical Findings
This section is an attempt to synthesize the main criticisms
that have been formulated against business and tax incentives
(tax exemption or alleviation) as a tool for local or regional
development, as well as to investigate the major trends in terms
of alternative policies. The following argument draws from the
U.S. literature on the topic; however, the points retained are
those relevant to the context of Third World countries.
There are three main sets of criticism regarding Business and Tax
incentives:
-- They have little effect on the location decision of
firms.
--They have a big opportunity cost in terms of foregone tax
revenues and alternative use of these revenues by the public
sector.
--They have little impact on employment and growth.
5.5.1. Effect of tax incentives on the location decision of
firms.
Many surveys conducted on firms either expanding their
facilities or moving to a new location show that state and local
taxes or the availability of subsidized credits are not
considered as important factors in the location decision process
(Harrison B. & Kanter S.1978). In most cases access to markets,
labor costs, and the availability of physical space were the
56
paramount location consideration (Harrison B. Kanter S. 1978).
Different sets of interviews showed that the availability of
these incentives did not induce business behavior that would not
have occurred otherwise. The incentives, therefore functioned as
a windfall for the companies more than anything else.
Tax incentives are ineffective precisely because state and
local taxes are, themselves, relatively unimportant as location
determinants (Vaughan J.R. 1980).
The reason why they have such little effect is that they
constitute a cost side policy and they do not affect revenues.
Since uncertainty is usually greater with respect to expected
revenues than costs, exclusively cost side policies are
insufficient to induce investment activity that would not have
taken place in the absence of the incentive. Furthermore, given
the relative scale of the base against which the incentives are
applied, their effect on the cost side is limited. The question
is% How important are state and local taxes as a percentage of
the typical firm's cost of doing business? If this ratio is very
small, then the application of even a large rate of subsidy to
such a small base is unlikely to yield significant savings to
most firms. In the empirical literature, state and local taxes
are consistently estimated at from 0.5 to 3 percent of value
added and from 2 to 5 percent of sales (Harrison B. & Kanter S.
1978).
5.5.2. Opportunity cost of Tax incentives.
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Though tax incentives have very little effect on reducing
each individual firm's cost of doing business, and in influencing
location decisions, they nevertheless represent in aggregate
terms a heavy cost for the state.
Tax incentives force the state to forego the tax revenue
which would have been collected in the absence of the policy.
These foregone revenues have other productive uses, and it is the
goods and services which those foregone revenues could have
purchased or provided that constitute the real opportunity cost
of the incentive. Moreover as these foregone tax revenues could
have financed new state spending having a positive multiplier
effect which is also foregone, then the net multiplier effect of
the tax incentives is negative.
5.5.3. Impact on employment and growth.
Various statistical tests conducted at different periods of
time, and in different places have led to the following
conclusions (all quoted in Harrison B. Kanter S. 1978):
-- There was no significant relationship between growth in
manufacturing employment and per capita state and local tax
collections among all the states (Bloom 1955).
-- There was no significant relationship between state and
local taxes and employment growth in the Michigan economy
from 1947 to 1953 (Thompson and Mattila 1959).
-- The rank ordering of eleven states in 1971 according to
the burden of state and local taxation on ten specific
58
industries showed that there was no systematic correlation
between this rank ordering and the state unemployment rates.
5.5.4. Trends in terms of alternative policies
Business and tax incentives aim at growth and job
generation. In the U.S., two third of all new jobs are generated
by small firms (those with twenty and fewer employees). It is the
smaller corporations despite their higher failure rates, that are
seeking out most new opportunities, while the large ones are
mainly redistributing their operations (D.Birch 1979). A growing
body of literature suggests that small businesses are not only
the major source of new jobs, but are also a major source of
technical innovation and tend to be quite profitable (Daniels B.
1980).
Recent evaluations of government intervention to create
economic development stress the following points: first the
limited importance of large business in the development process;
second the limited ability of capital to ensure economic growth;
third the limited availability of capital to small enterprises;
and fourth the limited ability of states and local development
efforts to encourage economic growth in a context of national and
international events (Daniels B. 1980).
Consequently well thought out economic development policies
must attempt to build on the comparative economic advantage of a
region to stimulate a diverse growing national economy. Public
policies that attempt to stimulate economic growth should target
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small businesses because of their profitability and their large
capacity to generate jobs and to innovate. Public policies should
not exclusively focus on capital; many other market factors --
such as land, labor, enerqy, management, raw materials, and
markets for the product-- must be made appropriately available to
a business before that capital can improve its viability (Daniels
B. 1980).
It is widely recognized however, that there are many
problems involved in helping small businesses. Firms in that
sector are small, independent, and volatile. They are the most
difficult to identify and to work with, and there is no
experience in identifying them and assisting them in large
numbers. It is precisely their dynamism and their vitality which
are at the origin of their big generation power, that make them a
difficult partner for the development administrator.
However these problems are not thought to be unsolvable. The
trend in terms of policy recommendation is to adopt indirect
approaches; to rely on existing networks of institutions rather
than building large new ones (Daniels B. 1980); to build ongoing
institutional capacity within the communities themselves to act
on their own behalf rather than to be "acted on"; to promote the
planning and financing of community based enterprises 
-- owned
wholly by local government or in partnership with socially
controlled private business (Barry Stein quoted by B. Harrison
and S. Kanter 1976).
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6. CONCLUSIDN
The ultimate objective of the Moroccan regional development
program was to promote regional development by changing capital
flows in favor of lagging regions. The policy tools used to
achieve this goal were public investment in health, education and
infrastructure; incentives to induce private investment in
peripheral areas; and administrative deconcentration.
These policy tools address some of the variables identified
as being critical to regional development in developing
countries. These variables were agglomeration and external
economies; transport network; entrepreneurship and technical and
managerial skills; and eventually information, perfect knowledge
and predictability.
Public investment in infrastructure has probably helped to
improve transport communications within and between regions; it
has probably helped to create in some areas higher levels of
external economies, but none of the peripheral areas of Morocco
can yet be considered as competitive in that regard as the two
developed regions of Center and North-West.
Although public investment in education and training helped
to make support staff skills available locally, the problems of
entrepreneurship and high level managerial and technical skills
can hardly be overcome because of the personal advantages
associated with life in big cities.
Administrative deconcentration is supposed to address the
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issue of information, knowledge and predictability. And actually
an effective decentralization of administrative power and
services, by transferring the power game at the local level --
even without changing its rules-- would lead to a substantial
lessening of spatial concentration. However the policy tool
adopted in Morocco, which is deconcentration or -- delegation of
responsibilities whereas power and decision making remain highly
centralized-- cannot, in any case, achieve that goal.
We have already seen the limited ability of tax incentives
to generate growth and employment, and to direct investment to
peripheral areas. Besides the limitations inherent to the policy
tool itself, centralization of administrative power, because it
implies centralization of relevant information for business
decision making and management, strongly affects the location
decisions of firms. It pushes towards business location in
developed regions and hampers all the measures undertaken to
induce private investment in lagging regions.
As we can see from the above, the analysis of the Moroccan
experience rises a set of different but interlinked issues. The
policy objective which was to promote regional development by
attracting external capital to the regions, framed the choice of
policy tools. These latter were not aimed at developing the
growth potentialities of the regions themselves. Such an
objective would have required the definition in the framework of
the national development strategy, of differentiated programs for
the different regions, based on each region's potentialities and
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comparative advantages. The policy tools were just aimed at
attracting external capital into the regions and trying to
fulfill within the regions the requirements of that foreign
capital. The whole battery of efforts was seriously hampered by
the excessive centralization of the Moroccan administrative
apparatus.
Actually the policy tools adopted could, to a certain
extent, address the critical variables for regional development
in Third World Countries. They could improve the conditions of
lagging regions, but they can hardly overcome capital flow trend.
When left to its own initiative, capital flows to where the
return is highest. And in most cases, return on investments is
highest in core regions.
In the current context of national and international events
(debt crisis, austerity programs), which require a most efficient
utilization of scarce public and private resources, using public
resources to try without much success to divert capital from the
areas of high return to peripheral regions is a luxury that few
developing countries can afford anymore.
However regional disparities are still a critical issue in
many LDC's and regional development is still a priority whose
stake is no less than social and political stability.
The following section sketches the elements of an
alternative regional development program, and presents the
rationale behind the policy recommendations.
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7. RECOMMENDATIONS
Regional development policies should aim at strengthening
the local, economical, institutional and financial basis for
development. These objectives involve strengthening local
governments; retaining local capital by involving local elites in
the development process; assisting small businesses.
-- Strengthening local governments
The goal of promoting lagging regions economies cannot be
achieved without the support of strong local governments.
They are those who are better informed as to the local
conditions, potentials and needs of the regions. Their
contributions to the programs definition and implementation
is crucial.
Strengthening local governments involves decentralizing
administrative power and services. It implies giving to
local governments the prerogative to raise (through a fiscal
decentralization) and to generate (through public or mixed
economic projects) revenues at the local level. It also
implies that local governments have to be endowed with the
managerial and technical skills necessary for local programs
definition implementation and management.
-- Retaining local capital and involving local elites in the
development process
Local elites often have a tendency to reinvest their profits
and to consume outside their regions when these latter are
underdeveloped. Involving these elites in the development
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process would change their investment and consumption
patterns, and would make of them the local motor of the
development process. In the long run they would constitute
the necessary counterweight to centralizing trends and they
would constitute a coalition to help increase local
autonomy.
-- Assisting small businesses
Small businesses (in the formal as well as in the informal
sector) are known for being innovative, and job and growth
generators. As such they ought to be the first target of
development policies. However they are also known for being
independent, volatile, and for having large failure rates.
Extensive studies are necessary to better know their modes
of operation, their problems, their viability, their
linkages and so on.
Choices will have to be made between blind assistance on a
large scale, or selective assistance in the framework of
national industrial development strategies.
Careful attention should be given to the modalities of
assistance. In order to reduce the costs of the programs and
to increase the chances of success, local governments and
existing networks have to be the basis on which to build
ongoing institutional capacity to define, implement, and
finance programs for assisting small businesses. They are
best located to assess the needs as well as to define,
implement, monitor the performances, and when necessary,
65
adjust the programs.
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